By Allen C. Guelzo, Ph.D., Gettysburg College
Over the first six weeks of the Constitutional Convention, almost all the attention had been devoted to the structure of the new National Legislature. But the next discussion on the National Executive was marked by the historical distrust of singular authority, as seen in the way colonial governors were perceived.
The Report of the Grand Committee
For all practical purposes, the report of the Grand Committee on July 5, 1787 and the vote which finally took place on this report on July 16, pretty well settled the question of what the new Congress would look like: two houses, the lower house to be elected broadly by the people as a whole, the upper house to elected by the state legislatures, and the authority for originating all revenue matters lodged with the lower house.
This was all a compromise, and neither James Madison, who wanted everything elected broadly, nor William Paterson, who wanted everything in the new Congress to represent state interests, was entirely happy with the result. But it was a result.
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The Fear of Colonial Governors
That result yielded at once to the next great subject lying before the Convention, and that was the shape of a new National Executive. And this promised to be no less thorny than the issue of representation in Congress. As Madison explained to Jefferson, any talk about a National Executive was going to sharpen to a point the old fear of power, jeopardizing liberty.
There was an unappealing executive example in American minds in the form of the colonial governors. Before the Revolution, every colony had a legislative assembly elected by the people, and a governor and a governor’s council appointed by the Crown in England. Only Connecticut and Rhode Island elected their own governors.
The Power of the Colonial Legislature
The lot of these colonial governors was not a happy one. Their appointment came from the Crown, so they were expected to represent the Crown’s interests. They had the power to make land grants and appointments to public office to their friends, but their salaries were provided by the legislatures, and the legislatures never hesitated to use salaries as leverage to counterpoise the authority of the Crown.
Fixed and stated salaries, one Massachusetts governor was tartly informed, were incompatible with our Constitution. Hence, the governors were frequently between a colonial rock and a royal hard place. Many of the colonial governors actually stayed in England and delegated authority to some hapless appointee who was really only the lieutenant governor.
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Powerful British Governors
The governors who did stay on the ground in America only made the reputation of governors worse in the 1770s by stubbornly resisting the movement toward independence and revolution.
Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of Virginia, had tried to seize Virginia’s cache of weapons and military supplies, and incited Virginia’s slaves to desert their masters and form what was called Dunmore’s Ethiopian Regiment.
Sir John Wentworth, the royal governor of New Hampshire, had tried to obstruct the New Hampshire militia’s takeover of Fort William & Mary in Portsmouth Harbor.
By the end of the Revolution, Americans wanted as little to do as possible with high and mighty executives.
Governors in the Confederation
The American political climate had not been much better for governors under the Confederation, either. The state constitutions which emerged from the Revolution, when they provided for a governor at all, ensured that the governors were kept on very short leashes: one-year terms; limitations on re-election; and election by the legislature.
In several states, an executive council created by the legislature further limited the governors’ authority. In Virginia, the governor could take no action without the advice of his council. And the Articles of Confederation were no more eager to authorize any other form of freewheeling executive.
Congress vs. Governor
The Confederation Congress reserved virtually all government powers—legislative and executive—to itself, and only provided for: one, a standing committee to manage affairs during Congress’s adjournment; and two, “to appoint one of their number to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of three years.”
The one notable exception to this rule in the early years of the American republic was New York, where the revolutionary constitution written in 1777 provided for a governor in whom was vested the supreme executive power and authority of this state. The governor was to be elected by the people at the same time as the assembly, not by the legislature. The governor would be the commander-in-chief of the state militia, and he was even granted a limited veto power over the legislature’s bills.
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A Powerful Governor
A governor could be elected indefinitely in New York. In fact, George Clinton had held the governorship of New York for all 10 years that the 1777 constitution had been in effect. Not only held it, but enjoyed it. He vetoed 58 pieces of legislation. He used the militia in apprehending such of Daniel Shays’s rebels who had fled to New York. He masterminded both his state’s rejection of the Congressional impost proposal and the issuance of £200,000 in paper money.
Some despised Clinton as a demagogue, but Clinton was a fine demonstration of what a powerful executive could do. None of these examples, however, offered a very satisfactory model for the Convention as it turned to the business of devising a new National Executive.
Common Questions about the Constitutional Convention’s Distrust of Executive Power
The appointment of colonial governors came from the Crown, so they were expected to represent the Crown’s interests. They had the power to make land grants and appointments to public office, but their salaries were provided by the legislatures, and the legislatures never hesitated to use salaries as leverage to counterpoise the authority of the Crown.
The state constitutions which emerged from the Revolution, when they provided for a governor at all, ensured that the governors were kept on very short leashes: one-year terms; limitations on re-election; and election by the legislature.
In New York, the revolutionary constitution written in 1777 provided for a governor in whom was vested the supreme executive power and authority of this state. A governor could be elected indefinitely in New York. In fact, George Clinton had held the governorship of New York for all 10 years that the 1777 constitution had been in effect. Some despised Clinton as a demagogue, but Clinton was a fine demonstration of what a powerful executive could do.
